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Abstract
This article examines mean-field-type game problems by means of a
direct method. We provide various solvable examples beyond the clas-
sical linear-quadratic game problems. These include quadratic-quadratic
games and games with power, logarithmic, sine square, hyperbolic sine
square payoffs. Non-linear state dynamics such as log-state, control-
dependent regime switching, quadratic state, cotangent state and hyper-
bolic cotangent state are considered. We identify equilibrium strategies
and equilibrium payoffs in state-and-conditional mean-field type feed-
back form. It is shown that a simple direct method can be used to
solve broader classes of non-quadratic mean-field-type games under jump-
diffusion-regime switching Gauss-Volterra processes which include frac-
tional Brownian motions and multi-fractional Brownian motions. We
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provide semi-explicit solutions to the fully cooperative, noncooperative
nonzero-sum, and adversarial game problems.
Keywords : Non-Linear, non-quadratic systems, mean-field-type games,
risk-awareness, direct method.
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1 Introduction
Mean-field-type game theory studies a class of games in which the payoffs and
or state dynamics depend not only on the state-action pairs but also the dis-
tribution of them. In mean-field-type games, (i) a single decision-maker can
have a strong impact on the mean-field terms, (ii) the expected payoffs are
not necessarily linear with respect to the state distribution, (iii) the number of
decision-makers (“true decision-makers”) is not necessarily infinite.
Games with non-linearly distribution-dependent quantity-of-interest [1, 2, 3]
are very attractive in terms of applications because the non-linear dependence
of the payoff functions in terms of state distribution allow us to capture risk
measures which are functionals of variance, inverse quantiles, and or higher
moments. During the past, a significant amount of research on mean-field-
type games has been performed [4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10]. In the time-dependent case,
the analysis of mean-field-type games has several challenges. Previous works
have devoted tremendous effort in terms of partial integro-differential system of
equations (PIDEs), in infinite dimensions, of conditional Liouville, Boltzmann,
Kolmogorov or McKean-Vlasov type. At the same time, an important set of
numerical tools have been developed to address the master equilibrium system.
However, the current state-of-the-art of numerical schemes is problem-specific
and needs to be adjusted properly depending on the underlying problem. To
date, the question of computation of the master system in the general setting
remains open. This work provides explicit solutions of a class of master systems.
These explicit solutions can be used to build reference trajectories and several
numerical schemes developed to solve PIDEs can be tested beyond the linear-
quadratic setting.
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1.1 Direct Method for LQ-MFTG
In the current literature, only relatively few examples of explicitly solvable
mean-field-type game problems are available. The most notable examples are (i)
linear-quadratic mean-field-type games (LQ-MFTG) [6], (ii) linear-exponentiated
quadratic mean-field-type games (LEQ-MFTG) [7] , (ii) adversarial linear-quadratic
mean-field-type games (minmax LQ, minmax LEQ-MFTG) [6]. In LQ-MFTG
the base state dynamics has two components: drift and noise.
• the drift is an affine function of the state, expected value of the state,
control action and expected value of the control actions of all decision-
makers. The coefficients are regime switching dependent.
• the noises are combination of diffusion, Gauss-Volterra, jump, regime-
switching process where the noise coefficients are affine functions of the
state, expected value of the state, control action and expected value of
the control actions of all decision-makers. The coefficients are regime
switching and jump dependent.
To the state dynamics, one can add a common noise which is a diffusion-Gauss-
Volterra-jump-regime-switching process. The cost functions are polynomial of
degree two and include the weighted conditional variances, co-variances between
state and control actions of all decision-makers. In addition, the cost functional
is not measured perfectly. Only a noisy cost is available.
This basic model of LQ mean-field-type games captures several interest-
ing features such as heterogeneity, risk-awareness and empathy of the decision-
makers.
To solve LQ-MFTG problems one can use the direct method proposed in Fig-
ure 3. This solution approach does not require solving the Bellman-Kolmogorov
equations or backward-forward stochastic differential equations of Pontryagin’s
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type. The proposed direct method can be easily implemented by beginners and
engineers who are new to the emerging field of mean-field-type game theory.
For this broader class of LQ-MFTG problem one can derive a semi-explicit
solution under sufficient conditions. The existence of solution to the master
system corresponding to the LQ-MFTG problem can be converted into an exis-
tence of solution to a system of ordinary differential equations driven by common
noises. In some particular cases, these systems are stochastic Riccati systems
and extensions of Riccati to include some fractional order terms.
1.2 Direct Method beyond LQ-MFTG
The direct method is not limited to the linear-quadratic case. The direct method
can be extended to a class of LEQ-MFTG, minmax LQ-MFTG and minmax
LEQ-MFTG. In this article, we present several examples to illustrate how the di-
rect method addresses non-linear and/or non-quadratic mean-field-type games.
The examples below go beyond LQ-MFTG, LEQ-MFTG and minmax LQ prob-
lems.
The contributions of this article can be summarized as follows. We provide
semi-explicit solution for classes of mean-field-type game problems presented in
Table 1. Several noises are examined: Brownian motion B, regime switching
s, jump process N , and Gauss-Volterra process Bgv. The Gauss-Volterra noise
processes are obtained from the integral of a Brownian motion with a suitable
kernel function. In addition, several type of common noises are considered:
s,Bo, No, Bo,gv.. We limit ourselves to the class of state-and-conditional mean-
field type feedback strategies. The analysis for more general class of strategies
is beyond the scope of this article.
To the best of the authors’ knowledge this is the first work to provide semi-
explicit solutions of mean-field-type games beyond LQ and under Gauss-Volterra
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Problem State Cost Noise
Prop. 1
Drift: x lnx+ x
∑
j∈I b2juj
I = {1, . . . , I} qi ln(x) + riu
2k
i , k >
1
2
Brownian: xdB
Jump:
∫
Θ
xµdN˜
Switching: q˜ss′
Prop. 2
Drift: b1x ln(x) +
∑
j∈I b2jxuj
I = {1, . . . , I} qi ln
2(x) + riu
2
i
Brownian: x
√
ln(x)
Switching: q˜ss′
Prop. 3
Drift: b1l1(x)
l′
1
(x) +
h(x)
∑
j b2juj
l′
1
(x)
I = {1, . . . , I}
qil1(x) +
∑
j∈I rij l1(uj)
Brownian:
√
σ2
1
+σ2
2
l1(x)
l′′
1
(x)
Switching: q˜ss′
Prop. 4
Drift: 2b
√
x
+x
[
σ2 + σ2o + σ
2
cogv + σ
2
o,cogv
+
∫
Θ
µ2ν(dθ) +
∫
Θ
µ2oνo(dθ)
]
I = {1, . . . , I}
qi
xk
k
+ ri
u2ki
k
Brownian: 2xσdB
Common Noise: 2xσodBo
Jump: 2x
∫
Θ
µdN˜
Common Jump: 2x
∫
Θ
µodN˜o
Switching: q˜ss′
Common G-V: 2xσo,gvdBo,gv
Gauss-Volterra: 2xσgvdBgv
Prop. 5
Drift: 0
s(t) ∈ S
I = {1, . . . , I}
ri(ui − u¯i)2 + r¯iu¯2i + ǫiu¯i
Switching: q˜ss′(u)
=
∑
j b2jss′ (uj − u¯j)2 + b¯2jss′ u¯2j
+
∑
j b1jss′ (uj − u¯j) + b¯1jss′ u¯j
+
∑
j b¯ojss′ ,
Prop. 6
Drift:
∑
j∈I [qj(uj − u¯j)2 + q¯j u¯2j
+ǫ1j(uj − u¯j) + ǫ¯1ju¯j ]
I = {1, . . . , I}
ri(ui − u¯i)2 + r¯iu¯2i + ǫ¯2iu¯i
Brownian: σdB
Jump:
∫
Θ µdN˜
Prop. 7
Drift: 12cot(
x−x¯
2 ) +
∑
j b2j(uj − u¯j)
+ 12cot(
x¯
2 ) +
∑
j b¯2j u¯j
I = {1, . . . , I}
((ui − u¯i)2 − qi) cos2(x−x¯4 ) + qi
+(u¯2i − q¯i) cos2( x¯4 ) + q¯i
Brownian: σdB
Switching: q˜ss′
Prop. 8
Drift: 12coth(
x−x¯
2 ) +
∑
j b2j(uj − u¯j)
+ 12coth(
x¯
2 ) +
∑
j b¯2j u¯j
I = {1, . . . , I}
((ui − u¯i)2 + qi) cosh2(x−x¯4 )− qi
+(u¯2i + q¯i) cosh
2( x¯4 )− q¯i
Brownian: σdB
Switching: q˜ss′
Prop. 9
Drift: − (u1 − u¯1) + b1(x − x¯)
+b2ǫ(x− x¯)(u2 − u¯2)
−u¯1 + b¯11x¯+ b¯12y¯ + b¯13z¯ + b¯2u¯2x¯
I = {1, . . . , I}
−q var(x) − r1 var(u1)
+r¯1
u¯
ρ
1
ρ
Brownian: σ(x − x¯)(u2 − u¯2)dB
Common noise: σ¯x¯u¯2dBo
Switching: q˜ss′
Prop. 10
Drift: b1(x− x¯) +
∑
j b2j(uj − u¯j)
+b¯1x¯+
∑
j b¯2ju¯j
I = {1, . . . , I}
qi
(x−x¯)2ki
2ki
+ ri
(ui−u¯i)
2ki
2ki
+q¯i
x¯2k¯i
2k¯i
+ r¯i
u¯
2k¯i
i
2k¯i
Brownian: (x − x¯)σdB
Jump: (x− x¯) ∫Θ µdN˜
Switching: q˜ss′
Gauss-Volterra: (x− x¯)σgvdBgv
Figure 1: Semi-explicit solutions presented in this article.
processes.
7
Structure
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 presents semi-explicit
solutions to some non-linear non-quadratic stochastic differential games. In Sec-
tion 3 we formulate and solve various mean-field-type games with non-quadratic
quantity-of-interest and provide semi-explicit solutions using a direct method.
Section 4 presents semi-explicit solutions to some non-quadratic mean-field-type
games driven by Gauss-Volterra processes. Numerical examples are presented
in Section 5. The last section summarizes the work.
Notation Description
B Brownian motion
Bo common Brownian motion
Bo,gv Common Gauss-Volterra process
Bgv Gauss-Volterra process
Θ set of jump sizes
ν(dθ), νo(dθ) Radon measure over Θ
N˜ compensated jump process
N˜o common compensated jump process
x state
y trend
∫ 0
−τ e
λt′x(t+ t′)dt′
z delayed state x(t − τ)
x¯ conditional state
s regime switching process
I = {1, . . . , I} set of decision-makers
ui control action of decision-maker i
u¯i conditional control action of i
Figure 2: Notations used in this article.
Preliminary
We introduce the following notations (see Table 2). Let [0, T ], T > 0 be a fixed
time horizon and (Ω,F ,FB,N,Bgv,s,Bo,Bo,gv ,No,P) be a given filtered probability
space. The filtration F = {FB,N,Bgv,s,Bo,Bo,gv ,Not , 0 ≤ t ≤ T } is the natural
filtration of the union of the family {B,N,Bgv, s, Bo, Bo,gv, No} augmented by
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P−null sets of F . In practice, B is used to capture smaller disturbance, N is
used for larger jumps of the system, Bgv is used for Gauss-Volterra processes
(including sub- or super diffusion). Let k ≥ 1. Lk([0, T ] × S;R) is the set
of measurable functions f : [0, T ] × S → R such that ∫ T
0
|f(t, s)|kdt < ∞.
Lk
F
([0, T ] × S;R) is the set of F-adapted R-valued processes X(·) such that
E[
∫ T
0
|X(t)|kdt] < ∞. The stochastic quantity x¯(t) = E[X(t)| Fs,Bo,Bo,gv ,Not ]
denotes the conditional expectation of the random variable X(t) with respect
to the filtration Fs,Bo,Bo,gv ,Not . Note that x¯ is a random process. Below, by abuse
of notation we use s(t), x(t) for the values s(t−), x(t−) inside the jump processes
N,No or the regime-switching process s. The set of decision-makers is denoted
by I = {1, . . . , I}. An admissible control strategy ui of the decision-maker i is an
F-adapted. We denote the set of all admissible controls by Ui: Decision-maker i
chooses a control strategy ui ∈ Ui to optimize its performance functional. The
information structure of the problem under perfect state observation and under
common noise observation (s,Bo, Bo,gv, No).
1.3 Conditional dynamics of mean-field type
Consider the following state dynamics of conditional McKean-Vlasov type with
time delays, trend, diffusion, jump, regime switching, Gauss-Volterra and com-
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mon noises.


dx = b(t, x, y, z, u, x¯, y¯, z¯, u¯,m1,m2, s)dt
+σ(t, x, y, z, u, x¯, y¯, z¯, u¯,m1,m2, s)dB
+σgv(t, x, y, z, u, x¯, y¯, z¯, u¯,m1,m2, s)dBgv
+
∫
Θ
µ(t, x, y, z, u, x¯, y¯, z¯, u¯,m1,m2, s, θ)N˜(dt, dθ, s)
+σo(t, x, y, z, u, x¯, y¯, z¯, u¯,m1,m2, s)dBo
+σo,gv(t, x, y, z, u, x¯, y¯, z¯, u¯,m1,m2, s)dBo,gv
+
∫
Θo
µo(t, x, y, z, u, x¯, y¯, z¯, u¯,m1,m2, s, θ)N˜o(dt, dθ, s)
xi(t) = xi0(t), t ∈ [−τi, 0], i ∈ I,
s(t) ∈ S = {1, 2, . . . , S},
P(s(t+ ǫ) = s′|s, u) = ∫ t+ǫ
t
q˜ss′dt
′ + o(ǫ), s′ 6= s, ǫ > 0
(1)
where
• I = {1, . . . , I} is the set of decision-makers.
• xi = xi(t) is the basic state at time t of the decision-maker i
• τik > 0 represents a time delay,
• yi = (xi(t− τik))1≤k≤K , is a K−dimensional delayed state vector,
• zi(t) = (
∫ t
t−τi
λi(dt
′)φil(t, t
′)xi(t
′))l≤I is the integral state vector of the
recent past state over [t − τi, t]. The trend of the state of decision-maker
i is its latest moving averages. zi(t) represents the trend of the state of i.
The process φil(t, t
′) is an Ft′−adapted locally bounded process, λi is a
positive and σ−finite measure on [−τi, T ].
• m1 is the distribution states of all the other decision-makers,
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• m2 the distribution of actions of all other decision-makers,
• xi0 is a initial deterministic function of state of i defined on [−τi, 0].
• B be a Brownian motion on T = [0, T ] with suitable dimension. Bo be a
Brownian motion observed by all decision-makers.
• Bgv be a Gauss-Volterra process on T with suitable dimension and with
integrable kernel K. Bo,gv be a Gauss-Volterra process observed by all
decision-makers
• N(dt, dθ, s) be a jump process with suitable dimension on T with com-
pensated jump N˜(dt, dθ, s) = N(dt, dθ, s)−ν(dθ)dt, ν is a Radon measure
over Θ. No is a common jump process observed by all decision-makers.
• s(t) is a regime switching process defined over the finite set S = {1, 2, . . . , S}
with switching rate q˜ satisfying q˜ss′ > 0, s 6= s′ and q˜ss := −
∑
s′ 6=s q˜ss′ .
We use 1l{s(t)=s} to denote the indicator function on the condition {s(t) =
s}.
• u = (ui)i∈I is the control strategy profile of all decision-makers. An
admissible control strategy ui of the decision-maker i is an F-adapted
process.
• The processes B,Bgv, N,Bo, Bo,gv, No, s, are defined in a given filtered
probability space (Ω,F,FB,N,Bgv,s,Bo,Bo,gv ,No,P) (F = {FB,N,Bgv,s,Bo,Bo,gv ,Not }t∈T ).
The processes Bo, Bo,gv, No, s are common noises assumed to be observ-
able by all decision-makers. All the processes are assumed to be mutually
independent.
• The coefficient functionals b, σ, σgv, µ, σo, σo,gv, µo are of compatible di-
mensions with x.
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• The quantity ω¯(t) = E[ω(t)| FBo,Bo,gv ,No,st ] denotes the conditional expec-
tation of the random variable ω(t) with respect to the filtration FBo,Bo,gv ,No,st .
Note that ω¯ is a random process. We take ω ∈ {u, x, y, z}. By abuse of
notation we use s(t), x(t) for the values s(t−), x(t−) inside the jump pro-
cesses N,No or the regime-switching process s.
Let f(t, x, s) be a twice continuously differentiable function in x and con-
tinuously differentiable in time t for each regime s ∈ S. Using [34] and [33,
Theorem 4.1], the stochastic integration formula, which is an extended Itoˆ’s
formula, yields


f(T, x(T ), s(T ))
= f(0, x0, s0) +
∫ T
0 [ft + 〈fx, b〉]dt
+ 12
∫ T
0
〈fxxσ, σ〉dt
+ 12
∫ T
0
〈fxxσcogv, σcogv〉dt
+
∫ T
0
∫
Θ
[f(x+ µ)− f(x)− 〈µ, fx〉]ν(θ)dt
+ 12
∫ T
0
〈fxxσo, σo〉dt
+ 12
∫ T
0
〈fxxσo,cogv, σo,cogv〉dt
+
∫ T
0
∫
Θ
[f(x+ µo)− f(x)− 〈µo, fx〉]νo(θ)dt
+
∫ T
0
∑
s′ 6=s[f(., x, s
′)− f(., x, s)]q˜ss′dt
+
∫ T
0 〈fx, σdB〉
+
∫ T
0 〈fx, σgvdBgv〉
+
∫ T
0
∫
Θ[f(x+ µ)− f(x)〉]N˜ (dt, dθ)
+
∫ T
0 〈fx, σodBo〉
+
∫ T
0
〈fx, σo,gvdBo,gv〉
+
∫ T
0
∫
Θ
[f(x+ µo)− f(x)〉]N˜o(dt, dθ).
(2)
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Notice that (2) applies to a one-dimensional state as well as to a vector,
matrix, tensor, lattice or another object in a Hilbert space. For vectors in an
Euclidean space, the inner product is 〈a, b〉 = ∑dl=1 albl, for matrices, 〈a, b〉 =
trace[a∗b] = trace[b∗a], where a∗ is the transpose of a.
1.4 Direct Method
Consider I decision-makers under perfect state observation x and common noise
observation (Bo, Bo,gv, No, s). Given I cost functionals Li(x, y, z, u, s) associated
with (1), we use (2) in the direct method described as follows. The direct method
consists of five elementary steps (see Figure 3).
Direct Method
1) MFTG
Problem
2) Guess
Functional
3) Stochastic
Integration
4) Terms
Completion
5) Process
Identification
Figure 3: Direct method and its key steps.
• The first step starts by setting the mean-field terms of the problem.
• The second step consists of the identification of a partial guess functional
where the coefficient functionals are random and regime switching depen-
dent. For each decision-maker i, one needs to identify a guess functional
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fi(t, x, y, z, u, s).
• In the third step we compute the difference Li−fi(t, x, y, z, u, s) using the
stochastic integration formula (2).
• In the fourth step, we use completion of terms in one-shot optimization for
both control actions and conditional mean-field of the control actions of
all decision-makers. Terms completion make E[Li − fi(t, x, y, z, u, s)] ≥ 0
by matching coefficients. The latter inequality becomes equality iff the
optimal control strategies are used.
• The fifth and last step uses an algebraic basis of linearly independent
processes to identify the coefficients. The identification leads to a (possi-
bly stochastic) differential system of equations, providing a semi-explicit
representation of the solution. The matched coefficients provide simpler
differential systems that are uncoupled with the state.
2 Some Solvable Mean-Field-Free Games
We start with mean-field-free settings where logarithm, logarithm square, Legendre-
Fenchel duality, and power payoffs are presented. The cost functions are not
necessarily quadratic and the state dynamics is not necessarily linear.
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2.1 Logarithmic Scale
Consider a set of decision makers I = {1, . . . , I} interacting in the following
non-linear non-quadratic mean-field-free game:


Li(x, u) = −qi(T, s(T )) ln(x(T )) +
∫ T
0
(−qi ln(x) + riu2ki ) dt,
infui E[Li(x, u)],
subject to
dx =
(
b1x ln(x) +
∑
j∈I b2jxuj
)
dt+ x[σdB +
∫
µdN˜ ],
P(s(t+ ǫ) = s′|s, u) = ∫ t+ǫ
t
q˜ss′dt
′ + o(ǫ), s′ 6= s
(3)
and with a given initial condition x(0) , x0 >> e, s(0) = s0 ∈ S, k ≥ 1 is an
integer, and q˜ss′ > 0, s 6= s′ and q˜ss := −
∑
s′ 6=s q˜ss′ . 
Proposition 1 Assume that x0 >> e, ri(.) > δ > 0, qi(.) ≥ 0, µ(θ) ≥ 0,∫
Θ
[ln(1+µ(θ))−µ(θ)]ν(dθ) <∞. The non-linear non-quadratic mean-field-free
Nash equilibrium and the corresponding equilibrium cost are given by:
u∗i =
∑
s∈S
1l{s(t)=s}[
1
2k
αib2i
ri
]
1
2k−1 ,
E[Li(x, u
∗)] = E[−αi(0, s0) ln(x0) + δi(0, s0)],
where αi and δi satisfies the following differential equations:
α˙i + qi + αib1 +
∑
s′ [αi(t, s
′)− αi(t, s)]q˜ss′ = 0,
δ˙i + αi[
σ2
2 −
∫
θ∈Θ[ln(1 + µ(θ))− µ(θ)]ν(dθ)]
+
∑
s′ [δi(t, s
′)− δi(t, s)]q˜ss′ − (2k − 1)ri( 12kri b2iαi)
2k
2k−1
−αi
∑
j 6=i b2j[
1
2k
αjb2j
rj
]
1
2k−1 = 0,
(4)
where αi(T, s) = qi(T, s), and δi(T, s) = 0 .
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.Proof. Consider the following guess functional:
fi(t, x, s) = −αi ln(x) + δi.
By applying Itoˆ’s formula for jump-diffusion-regime switching processes, the
gap between the cost and the guess functional E[Li(x, u) − fi(0, x0)] can be
computed and it is given by
E[Li(x, u)− fi(0, x0, s0)]
= E (−qi(T, s(T )) + αi(T, s(T ))) ln(x(T )) + δi(T, s(T ))
E
∫ T
0
−{α˙i + qi + αib1 +
∑
s′ [αi(t, s
′)− αi(t, s)]q˜ss′}ln(x)dt
+
∫ T
0
δ˙i +
σ2
2 αi +
∑
s′ [δi(t, s
′)− δi(t, s)]q˜ss′dt
+
∫ T
0
−(2k − 1)ri( 12kri b2iαi)
2k
2k−1 − αi
∑
j 6=i b2j[
1
2k
αjb2j
rj
]
1
2k−1
− ∫ T
0
αi
∫
θ∈Θ
[ln(1 + µ(θ))− µ(θ)]ν(dθ)dt
+E
∫ T
0
[−b2iαiui + riu2ki + (2k − 1)ri( 12kri b2iαi)
2k
2k−1 ]dt,
(5)
Noting that
[−b2iαiui + riu2ki + (2k − 1)ri(
1
2kri
b2iαi)
2k
2k−1 ] ≥ 0
with equality iff ui = u
∗
i := [
1
2k
αib2i
ri
]
1
2k−1 , the announced result follows. 
Notice that the differential system (4) has a unique solution: the system in
α is linear and the system in δ is obtained by integration. ln(x) is well-defined
because the state x stays positive in [0, T ] almost surely if one starts at x0 >> e.
Remark 1 For k = 1 the system reduces to the following ordinary differential
equations:
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u∗i = [
1
2
αib2i
ri
],
E[Li(x, u
∗)] = E[αi(0) ln(x0)] + δi(0)],
α˙i + qi + αib1 +
∑
s′ [αi(t, s
′)− αi(t, s)]q˜ss′ = 0,
δ˙i +
σ2
2 αi +
∑
s′ [δi(t, s
′)− δi(t, s)]q˜ss′
− 14ri b22iα2i − 12αi
∑
j 6=i b
2
2j
αj
rj
−αi
∫
θ∈Θ
[ln(1 + µ(θ)) − µ(θ)]ν(dθ) = 0
(6)
2.2 Logarithm square
Consider the following non-linear non-quadratic mean-field-free game:


Li(x, u) = qi(T, s(T )) ln
2(x(T )) +
∫ T
0
(
qi ln
2(x) + riu
2
i
)
dt,
infui E[Li(x, u)],
subject to
dx =
(
b1x ln(x) +
∑
j∈I b2jxuj
)
dt,
x(0) , x0 >> e,
P(s(t+ ǫ) = s′|s, u) = ∫ t+ǫ
t
q˜ss′dt
′ + o(ǫ), s′ 6= s
(7)

Proposition 2 Assume that x0 >> e, qi(t, s) ≥ 0, ri(t, s) > δ > 0, and∫
θ∈Θ[ln(1 + µ(θ)) − µ(θ)]ν(dθ) < ∞. The non-linear non-quadratic mean-field-
free Nash equilibrium and corresponding optimal cost are given by:
u∗i = −
∑
s∈S
1l{s(t)=s}
αib2i
ri
ln(x),
E[Li(x, u
∗)] = E[αi(0) ln
2(x0)],
17
where αi satisfies the following differential equation:
α˙i = −qi − 2b1αi + 2αi
∑
j∈I\{i}
αj
b22j
rj
+α2i
b22i
ri
+
∑
s′∈S
[αi(t, s
′)− αi(t, s)]q˜ss′ ,
αi(T, s) = qi(T, s),

Proof. Consider the following guess functional:
fi(t, x) = αi ln
2(x).
Applying the Itoˆ’s formula yields
fi(T, x(T ))− fi(0, x0) =
∫ T
0
α˙i ln
2(x)dt
+
∫ T
0
2αi ln(x)

b1 ln(x) +∑
j∈I
b2juj

 dt
+
∫ T
0
∑
s′∈S
[αi(t, s
′)− αi(t, s)]q˜ss′ ln2(x)dt
Thus, the gap E[Li(x, u)− fi(0, x0)] is given by
E[Li(x, u)− fi(0, x0)] = E (qi(T )− αi(T )) ln2(x(T ))
+ E
∫ T
0
qi ln
2(x)dt + E
∫ T
0
α˙i ln
2(x)dt
+ E
∫ T
0

2αib1 ln2(x) + 2αi ln(x) ∑
j∈I\{i}
b2juj

 dt
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+ E
∫ T
0
ri
(
u2i + 2αi
ln(x)b2i
ri
ui
)
dt
+
∫ T
0
∑
s′∈S
[αi(t, s
′)− αi(t, s)]q˜ss′ ln2(x)dt
By performing square completion one obtains
(
ui + αi
ln(x)b2i
ri
)2
− α2i
ln2(x)b22i
r2i
= u2i + 2αi
ln(x)b2i
ri
ui,
then,
E[Li(x, u)− fi(0, x0)] = (qi(T )− αi(T )) ln2(x(T ))
+ E
∫ T
0
qi ln
2(x)dt + E
∫ T
0
α˙i ln
2(x)dt
+ E
∫ T
0

2αib1 ln2(x) − 2αi ln2(x) ∑
j∈I\{i}
αj
b22j
rj

 dt
+ E
∫ T
0
ri
(
ui + αi
ln(x)b2i
ri
)2
dt
− E
∫ T
0
α2i
ln2(x)b22i
ri
dt
+ E
∫ T
0
∑
s′∈S
[αi(t, s
′)− αi(t, s)]q˜ss′ ln2(x)dt
Finally, the announced result is obtained by minimizing the terms. 
2.3 Legendre-Fenchel
We consider a convex running loss functions l1, l2.
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

Li = qiT l1(xT ) +
∫ T
0 qil1(x) +
∑
j∈I rij l2(uj)dt,
infui E[Li],
subject to
P(s(t+ ǫ) = s′|s) = ∫ t+ǫ
t
q˜ss′dt
′ + o(ǫ), s′ 6= s
dx = [ b1l1(x)
l′
1
(x) +
h(x)
∑
j b2juj
l′
1
(x) ]dt+
√
σ2
1
+σ2
2
l1(x)
l′′
1
(x) dB,
x(0) = x0, s(0) = s0
(8)
where q˜ss′ > 0, s 6= s′ and q˜ss := −
∑
s′ 6=s q˜ss′ . Recall that the Legendre-Fenchel
transform of l, is given by
−l∗(x) = inf
u
{l(u)− xu}.
Proposition 3 Assume that l1, l2, l
′′
2 , rij , qi are positive. Then, the game prob-
lem (8) has a solution:
u∗i =
∑
s∈S 1l{s(t)=s}(l
∗
2)
′(− b2iαi
rii
h(x)),
E[Li(x, u)] = E[αi(0, s0)l(x0) + δi(0, s0)],
(9)
with
α˙i + qi + αi(b1 +
σ22
2 ) +
∑
s′(αi(t, s
′)− αi(t, s))q˜ss′
−ηii +
∑
j 6=i ηij + αib2jγj = 0,
δ˙i +
σ21
2 +
∑
s′(δi(t, s
′)− δi(t, s))q˜ss′ = 0
(10)
where
riil
∗
2(− b2iαirii h(x)) = ηiil1(x),
rij l2(u
∗
j ) = ηij l1(x),
h(x)(l∗2)
′[−αjb2j
rjj
h(x)] = γj l1(x),
(11)
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These conditions are fulfilled by choosing for example
l2(y) = yh(y), l1 = κl2, h(x) =
x2k−1
2k
.

Proof Step 1: we observe that the structure of the problem is mainly driven
by the evolution of the function l1.
Step 2: Inspired the nature of the problem, we propose a guess functional in
the form of l1 with deterministic coefficients αi, δi. Let fi(t, x, s) = αi(t, s)l1(x)+
δi(t, s).
Step 3: We apply stochastic integration formula for diffusion-regime switch-
ing to obtain the difference between the cost and the guess functional as
E[Li(x, s, u)− fi(0, x0, s0)]
= E(qi(T, s(T ))− αi(T, s(T )))l1(x(T )) + (0 − δi(T, s(T )))
+E
∫ T
0 [α˙i + qi + αi(b1 +
σ22
2 )
+
∑
s′(αi(t, s
′)− αi(t, s))q˜ss′ ]l(x)
+δ˙i +
σ21
2 +
∑
s′(δi(t, s
′)− δi(t, s))q˜ss′
−riil∗2(− b2iαirii h(x)) +
∑
j 6=i{rij l2(u∗j ) + αib2jh(x)u∗j}
+{rii[l2(ui) + αib2ih(x)rii ui] + riil∗2(−
αib2ih(x)
rii
)}dt
(12)
Step 4: Observing that
{[l2(ui) + αib2ih(x)
rii
ui] + l
∗
2(−
αib2ih(x)
rii
)} ≥ 0,
with equality iff ui = u
∗
i , the one-shot optimization provides u
∗
j = (l
∗
2)
′[−αjb2j
rjj
h(x)],
Step 5: By identification of processes, the announced result follows. This
completes the proof. 
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2.4 Geometric Gauss-Volterra Game
The Gauss-Volterra processes are singular integrals of a standard Brownian
motion and include (i) fractional Brownian motions, (ii) Liouville fractional
Brownian motions, and (iii) multi-fractional Brownian motions. The difficulty
of finding semi-explicit solution is significantly increased if the noise process and
thereby the state process is driven by non-Markov processes or non-martingales.
Let Bgv be a Gauss-Volterra process with zero mean and covariance
c(t, t′) = E[Bgv(t)Bgv(t
′)] =
∫ min(t,t′)
0
K(t, t′′)K(t′, t′′)dt′′.
The kernel K is assumed to have causality, continuity and integrability proper-
ties as in [27]. The variance of the process
∫ t
0
σgv(t
′, s)dBgv(t
′) is given by
σ2cogv =
d
dt
[ ∫ t
0
{
K(t′+, t
′)σgv(t
′) +
∫ t
t′
σgv(t
′′)K(t′, t′′)dt′′
}2
dt′
]
.
Consider the following geometric Gauss-Volterra game with unobserved pro-
cesses Bo, Bo,gv, No which are assumed to be independent.


infui ELi(x, u) = EqiT
xkT
k
+
∫ T
0
(
qi
xk
k
+ ri
u2ki
k
)
dt,
subject to
dx =
(
2b
√
x+ x
[
σ2 + σ2o + σ
2
cogv + σ
2
o,cogv
+
∫
Θ
µ2ν(dθ) +
∫
Θ
µ2oνo(dθ)
])
dt
+2x
[
σdB + σodBo +
∫
Θ µdN˜ +
∫
Θ µodN˜o
+σgvdBgv + σo,gvdBo,gv
]
,
(13)
where b = b1
√
x +
∑
j∈I b2juj, and σ, σo, σgv , σo,gv, µ, and µo are real valued
and regime-switching dependent functions s(t) with q˜ss′ > 0, s 6= s′ and q˜ss :=
22
−∑s′ 6=s q˜ss′ .
Proposition 4 Assume that qi ≥ 0, ri > δ > 0, x0 > 0, k ≥ 1. The mean-
field-free equilibrium for the Geometric Gauss-Volterra Game in (13) is given
by
u∗i =
∑
s∈S
1l{s(t)=s}
(
−αib2i
ri
) 1
2k−1 √
x,
ELi(x, u
∗) = Eαi(0, s0)
xk0
k
,
where αi satisfies the following differential equation:
α˙i + qi + kαi([σ
2 + σ2o + σ
2
cogv + σ
2
o,cogv]
+
∫
Θ µ
2ν(dθ) +
∫
Θ µ
2
oνo(dθ))
+2kb1αi + 2k(k − 1)αi(σ2 + σ2o + σ2cogv + σ2o,cogv
+
∫
Θ µ
2ν(dθ) +
∫
Θ µ
2
oνo(dθ))
−
(
−αib2i
ri
) 2k
2k−1
ri(k − 12 )
+2αik
∑
j 6=i b2j
(
−αjb2j
rj
) 1
2k−1
+
∑
s′(αi(t, s
′)− αi(t, s))q˜ss′ = 0,
(14)

Proof. This proof is developed following a direct method.
Step 1: Observe that the problem is a mean-field free problem driven by
√
x.
Step 2: Based on the structure of the problem we propose the following
guess functional:
fi(t, x, s) = αi(t, s)
xk
k
,
Step 3: We apply stochastic integration formula for jump-diffusion-regime-
switching Gauss-Volterra and common noises to compute the difference between
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the costs and the guess functionals, i.e.,
E[Li(x, u)− fi(0, s0)] = E(qi,T − αi(T, s(T )))x
k(T )
k
+E
∫ T
0
(qi + α˙i)
xk
k
+ kαi
xk
k
([σ2 + σ2o + σ
2
cogv + σ
2
o,cogv]
+
∫
Θ
µ2dν(θ) +
∫
Θ
µ2odνo(θ))
+2kb1αi
xk
k
+2k(k − 1)αi xkk (σ2 + σ2o + σ2cogv + σ2o,cogv
+
∫
Θ µ
2dν(θ) +
∫
Θ µ
2
odνo(θ))
+[ri
u2ki
k
+ 2αix
k− 1
2 b2iui] + 2αix
k− 1
2
∑
j 6=i b2juj
+x
k
k
∑
s′(αi(t, s
′)− αi(t, s))q˜ss′ ,
Step 4: we perform terms completion:
u∗i =
(
−αib2i
ri
) 1
2k−1 √
x,
Step 5: We perform process identification after having replaced back the
optimal control inputs in the gap E[Li(x, u)− fi(0, s0)], i.e.,
E[Li(x, u)− fi(0, s0)] = (qi,T − αi(T, s(T )))x
k(T )
k
+
∫ T
0 (qi + α˙i)
xk
k
+ kαi
xk
k
([σ2 + σ2o + σ
2
cogv + σ
2
o,cogv]
+
∫
Θ µ
2dν(θ) +
∫
Θ µ
2
odνo(θ))
+2kb1αi
xk
k
+2k(k − 1)αi xkk (σ2 + σ2o + σ2cogv + σ2o,cogv
+
∫
Θ
µ2dν(θ) +
∫
Θ
µ2odνo(θ))
+[ri
u2ki
k
+ 2αix
k− 1
2 b2iui +
(
−αib2i
ri
) 2k
2k−1
ri(1− 12k )xk]
+
[
− k
(
−αib2i
ri
) 2k
2k−1
ri(k − 12 )
+2αik
∑
j 6=i b2j
(
−αjb2j
rj
) 1
2k−1
]
xk
k
+x
k
k
∑
s′(αi(t, s
′)− αi(t, s))q˜ss′dt,
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Finally, the announced result is obtained by minimizing terms, which completes
the proof. 
Notice that under the conditions: qi ≥ 0, ri > δ > 0, i ∈ I, k ≥ 1 the
differential system (14) has a positive solution.
When s,Bo, Bo,gv, No are noises observed by all decision-makers (observed
common noises), the ordinary differential system in α becomes a stochastic
differential system driven by the union of events with Bo, Bo,gv, No.
−dαi = qidt+ kαi(σ2 + σ2o + σ2gv + σ2o,gv
+
∫
Θ µ
2ν(dθ) +
∫
Θ µ
2
oνo(dθ))dt
+2kb1αi + 2k(k − 1)αi(σ2 + σ2o + σ2gv + σ2o,gvdt
+
∫
Θ µ
2ν(dθ) +
∫
Θ µ
2
oνo(dθ))dt
−
(
−αib2i
ri
) 2k
2k−1
ri(k − 12 )dt
+2αik
∑
j 6=i b2j
(
−αjb2j
rj
) 1
2k−1
dt
+
∑
s′(αi(t, s
′)− αi(t, s))q˜ss′dt
+2k
[
αi,Boσo +
∫
Θ µoαi,Noνo(dθ) + cov[σo,gvdBgv, αi,BgvdBgv]
]
dt
+2kαi
[
σdB + σodBo +
∫
Θ
µdN˜ +
∫
Θ
µodN˜o
+σgvdBgv + σo,gvdBo,gv
]
(15)
with the terminal condition qi(T, s) ≥ 0 being FBo,Bo,gv ,No-measurable random
coefficient.
3 Some Solvable Mean-Field-Type Games
3.1 Control-dependent switching MFTG
In most continuous time MFTG models with regime switching considered in the
literature it is assumed that the switching rate q˜ss′ is control-independent. In
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this subsection, we provide an example with control-dependent switching rate
q˜ss′(u) in which the MFTG problem can be solved semi-explicitly.


Li = qiT +
∫ T
0
ri(ui − u¯i)2 + r¯iu¯2i + ǫiu¯idt,
infui E[Li],
subject to
P(s(t+ ǫ) = s′|s, u) = ∫ t+ǫ
t
q˜ss′(u)dt
′ + o(ǫ), s′ 6= s
q˜ss′(u) =
∑
j b2jss′(uj − u¯j)2 + b¯2jss′ u¯2j
+
∑
j b1jss′ (uj − u¯j) + b¯1jss′ u¯j + b¯ojss′ ,
(16)
where bkjss′ > 0 for s
′ 6= s and Eb1jss′ = 0.
Proposition 5 Assume that ri, r¯i > 0. The equilibrium strategy is
u∗i = −
∑
s∈S 1l{s(t)=s}
1
2 .
∑
s′∈S Vi(t,s
′)b1iss′
ri+
∑
s′∈S Vi(t,s
′)b2iss′
−∑s∈S 1l{s(t)=s} 12 . ǫi+∑s′∈S Vi(t,s′)b¯1iss′r¯i+∑s′∈S Vi(t,s′)b¯2iss′ ,
(17)
and the equilibrium cost is Vi(t, s), which satisfies the following ordinary differ-
ential system:
V˙i +
∑
s′∈S Vi(t, s
′)b¯ojss′
− 14
(
∑
s′∈S Vi(t,s
′)b1iss′ )
2
[ri+
∑
s′∈S Vi(t,s
′)b2iss′ ]
− 14
(ǫi+
∑
s′∈S Vi(t,s
′)b¯1iss′)
2
[r¯i+
∑
s′∈S Vi(t,s
′)b¯2iss′ ]
+ 14
∑
j 6=i[
∑
s′∈S Vi(t, s
′)b2jss′ ](
∑
s′∈S Vj(t,s
′)b1jss′
rj+
∑
s′∈S Vj(t,s
′)b2jss′
)2
+ 14
∑
j 6=i[
∑
s′∈S Vi(t, s
′)b¯2jss′ ](
ǫj+
∑
s′∈S Vj(t,s
′)b¯1jss′
r¯j+
∑
s′∈S Vj(t,s
′)b¯2jss′
)2
− 12
∑
j 6=i[
∑
s′∈S Vi(t, s
′)b1jss′ ](
∑
s′∈S Vj(t,s
′)b1jss′
rj+
∑
s′∈S Vj(t,s
′)b2jss′
)
− 12
∑
j 6=i[
∑
s′∈S Vi(t, s
′)b¯1jss′ ](
ǫj+
∑
s′∈S Vj(t,s
′)b¯1jss′
r¯j+
∑
s′∈S Vj(t,s
′)b¯2jss′
) = 0,
Vi(T, s) = qi(T, s), s ∈ S,
(18)

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Proof.
Step 1: We observe that the structure of the problem does not have a drift
and is driven by regime switching.
Step 2: Based on step 1, we propose guess in the following form: Vi(t, s).
Step 3: we use the stochastic integration formula for regime-switching to
compute the difference between the cost and the guess functional as:
E[Li(s, u)− Vi(0, s0)] = E[qiT − Vi(T, s(T ))]
+E
∫ T
0 V˙i +
∑
s′∈S Vi(t, s
′)b¯ojss′
− 14
(
∑
s′∈S Vi(t,s
′)b1iss′)
2
ri+
∑
s′∈S Vi(t,s
′)b2iss′
+ 14
∑
j 6=i[
∑
s′∈S Vi(t, s
′)b2jss′ ](
∑
s′∈S Vj(t,s
′)b1jss′
rj+
∑
s′∈S Vj(t,s
′)b2jss′
)2
− 12
∑
j 6=i[
∑
s′∈S Vi(t, s
′)b1jss′ ](
∑
s′∈S Vj(t,s
′)b1jss′
rj+
∑
s′∈S Vj(t,s
′)b2jss′
)
− 14
(ǫi+
∑
s′∈S Vi(t,s
′)b¯1iss′ )
2
[r¯i+
∑
s′∈S Vi(t,s
′)b¯2iss′ ]
,
+ 14
∑
j 6=i[
∑
s′∈S Vi(t, s
′)b¯2jss′ ](
ǫj+
∑
s′∈S Vj(t,s
′)b¯1jss′
r¯j+
∑
s′∈S Vj(t,s
′)b¯2jss′
)2
− 12
∑
j 6=i[
∑
s′∈S Vi(t, s
′)b¯1jss′ ](
ǫj+
∑
s′∈S Vj(t,s
′)b¯1jss′
r¯j+
∑
s′∈S Vj(t,s
′)b¯2jss′
)
+[ri +
∑
s′∈S Vi(t, s
′)b2iss′ ]{ui − u¯i + 12
∑
s′∈S Vi(t,s
′)b1iss′
ri+
∑
s′∈S Vi(t,s
′)b2iss′
}2dt
+[r¯i +
∑
s′∈S Vi(t, s
′)b¯2iss′ ]{u¯i + 12
ǫi+
∑
s′∈S Vi(t,s
′)b¯1iss′
r¯i+
∑
s′∈S Vi(t,s
′)b¯2iss′
}2dt
(19)
Step 4: Assuming that [ri+
∑
s′∈S Vi(t, s
′)b2iss′ ] > 0, and [r¯i+
∑
s′∈S Vi(t, s
′)b¯2iss′ ] >
0 the terms completion lead to a one-shot optimization of a strictly convex and
coercive function.
Step 5: the minimization and the identification of the processes provides the
announced result.
3.2 Quadratic-Quadratic MFTG
This example examines a class of Quadratic-Quadratic Mean-Field-Type Game
(QQ-MFTG) problem. The state is non-linear in u. A semi-explicit solution is
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derived.


Li(x, u) = qiTxT +
∫ T
0
ri(ui − u¯i)2 + r¯iu¯2i + ǫ¯2iu¯idt
infui E[Li(x, u)],
subject to
dx =
∑
j∈I [qj(uj − u¯j)2 + q¯j u¯2j + ǫ1j(uj − u¯j) + ǫ¯1ju¯j ]dt
+σdB +
∫
µdN˜,
x(0) = x0.
(20)
where the coefficients are regime-switching dependent with switching rate ma-
trix Q˜ = (q˜ss′ , (s, s
′) ∈ S2).
Proposition 6 Assume that ri > 0, qi ≥ 0, ri > δ > 0, r¯i > 0, q¯i ≥ 0, r¯i > δ >
0, E[ǫ1i] = 0, ∀i ∈ I. The QQ-MFTG problem (20) has unique solution and it
is given by
u∗i − u¯∗i = −
∑
s∈S 1l{s(t)=s}
αi
2(ri+αiqi)
ǫ1i,
u¯∗i = −
∑
s∈S 1l{s(t)=s}[
[ǫ¯2i+αiǫ¯1i]
2[r¯i+αi q¯i]
],
EL∗i = E[αi(0, s(0))x0]
+E
∫ T
0 {
αi
∑
j 6=i qj
(
αj
2(rj+αjqj)
ǫ1j
)2
+ αi
∑
j 6=i q¯j
(
[ǫ¯2j+αj ǫ¯1j ]
2[r¯j+αj q¯j ]
)2
−
(
αi
∑
j 6=i ǫ1j
(
αj
2(rj+αjqj)
ǫ1j
)
+ αi
∑
j 6=i ǫ¯1j
(
[ǫ¯2j+αj ǫ¯1j ]
2[r¯j+αj q¯j ]
))
− α2i4(ri+αiqi)ǫ21i −
[ǫ¯2i+αiǫ¯1i]
2
4[r¯i+αiq¯i]
} dt
(21)
Note that the semi-explicit solution is in fact an explicit solution. Let ~αi(t) =
[αi(t, s)]s∈S , and ~qi(T ) = [qi(T, s)]s∈S , then ~αi(t) is explicitly given by
~αi(t) = ~qi(T ) exp
[
−
∫ T
t
Q˜dt′
]
.
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in particular ~αi(0) = ~qi(T ) exp[−
∫ T
0
Q˜dt′]. 
Proof. Let us consider the following guess functional: Vi = αix. Then,
∂tVi = α˙ix, ∂xVi = αi,
Vi(t, x+ µ)− Vi(t, x)− ∂xViµ = 0,
Itoˆ’s formula yields
Vi(T )− Vi(0) =
∫ T
0
(
α˙ix+ αi
∑
j∈I qj(uj − u¯j)2
+αi
∑
j∈I q¯j u¯
2
j + αi
∑
j∈I ǫ1j(uj − u¯j)
+αi
∑
j∈I ǫ¯1j u¯j +
∑
s′∈S x (αi(., s
′)− αi(., s)) q˜ss′ ) dt
+
∫ T
0 αiσdB +
∫
Θ αiµN˜(dt, dθ).
(22)
Thus, the difference E[Li − Vi(0)] is given by
E[Li − Vi(0)] = E [qi(T )x(T )− Vi(T )]
+E
∫ T
0
ri(ui − u¯i)2 + r¯iu¯2i + ǫ¯2iu¯i
+α˙ix+ αi
∑
j∈I qj(uj − u¯j)2
+αi
∑
j∈I q¯j u¯
2
j + αi
∑
j∈I ǫ1j(uj − u¯j)
+αi
∑
j∈I ǫ¯1j u¯j + x
∑
s′∈S (αi(., s
′)− αi(., s)) q˜ss′ dt
(23)
Performing square completion yields
(
(ui − u¯i)2 + αiri+αiqi ǫ1i(ui − u¯i)
)
=
(
ui − u¯i + αi2(ri+αiqi)ǫ1i
)2
− α2i4(ri+αiqi)2 ǫ21i,(
u¯2i +
[ǫ¯2i+αiǫ¯1i]
[r¯i+αi q¯i]
u¯i
)
=
(
u¯i +
[ǫ¯2i+αiǫ¯1i]
2[r¯i+αiq¯i]
)2
− [ǫ¯2i+αiǫ¯1i]2
4[r¯i+αi q¯i]
2 ,
(24)
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E[Li − Vi(0)] = E [qi(T )x(T )− Vi(T )]
+E
∫ T
0 α˙ix+ αi
∑
j 6=i qj(uj − u¯j)2 + αi
∑
j 6=i q¯j u¯
2
j
+αi
∑
j 6=i ǫ1j(uj − u¯j) + αi
∑
j 6=i ǫ¯1j u¯j
+(ri + αiqi)
(
ui − u¯i + αi2(ri+αiqi)ǫ1i
)2
− α2i4(ri+αiqi)ǫ21i
+ [r¯i + αiq¯i]
(
u¯i +
[ǫ¯2i+αi ǫ¯1i]
2[r¯i+αiq¯i]
)2
− [ǫ¯2i+αi ǫ¯1i]24[r¯i+αi q¯i] +
∑
s′∈S x (αi(., s
′)− αi(., s)) q˜ss′
(25)
Minimizing terms it yields
α˙i(t, s) = −
∑
s′∈S
(αi(., s
′)− αi(., s)) q˜ss′ ,
αi(T, s) = qi(T, s),
completing the proof. 
Remark 2 Notice that using the result presented in Proposition 6, the following
Quadratic-Exponential-Quadratic Mean-Field-Type Game (QEQ-MFTG) prob-
lem:


Li(x, u) = qiTxT +
∫ T
0 ri(ui − u¯i)2 + r¯iu¯2i + ǫ¯2iu¯idt,
infui E exp [λiLi(x, u)] ,
subject to
dx =
∑
j∈I [qj(uj − u¯j)2 + q¯j u¯2j + ǫ1j(uj − u¯j) + ǫ¯1j u¯j]dt
+σdB +
∫
µdN˜,
x(0) = x0.
(26)
can be solved explicitly. 
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3.3 Quadratic State and Power Utility
This subsection examines a class of mean-field-type games with power payoffs
and a non-linear state. The model is inspired from the modern portfolio opti-
mization under shared asset platform by several decision-makers. The state x(t)
is the total amount of money. Decision-maker i can decide to consume certain
amount u1i and re-allocate the remaining between less-risky assets (1− u2i)κ2x
and more risky assets u2iκ2x + u¯2ix[σdB +
∫
µdN˜ ]. The coefficients κ1, κ2 de-
pend on time t and on the switching regime s(t) which takes values in S. The
set S is non-empty and finite. We have modified the model to include mean-
field terms, a function of the expected value of the state and a function of the
expected value of the control action.


Ri(x, u) = −qiT (xT − x¯T )
2ki
2ki
+ q¯iT
x¯
ρ¯i
T
ρ¯i
+
∫ T
0
−qi (x− x¯)
2ki
2ki
+ q¯i
x¯ρ¯i
ρ¯i
− ri (u1i − u¯1i)
2ki
2ki
+ r¯i
u¯
ρ¯i
1i
ρ¯i
dt,
supui E[Ri(x, u)],
subject to
dx =
∑
i∈I [−(u1i − u¯1i) + (1 − (u2i − u¯2i))κ1(x− x¯)]
+
∑
i∈I(u2i − u¯2i)κ2(x − x¯)dt
+
∑
i∈I(u2i − u¯2i)(x − x¯)[σdB +
∫
µdN˜ ]
+
∑
i∈I [−u¯1i + (1− u¯2i)κ¯1x¯+ u¯2iκ¯2x¯]dt
+
∑
i∈I u¯2ix¯[σ¯dBo +
∫
µ¯dN˜o],
x(0) = x0.
(27)
where the coefficients are regime-switching dependent, and ki ≥ 1, ρ¯i ∈ (0, 1).
The coefficients qi, q¯i, ri, r¯i are positive. The state dynamics (27) is not linear
in (x, u).
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Following the same method as in the problem (27), a semi-explicit solution
can be derived.
Note that a similar method can be used to derive semi-explicit solution to
the following game problem in which decision-makers minimize with ki(t, s) >
1, ρ¯i(t, s) > 1.


Li(x, u) = qiT
(xT−x¯T )
2ki
2ki
+ q¯iT
x¯
ρ¯i
T
ρ¯i
+
∫ T
0 qi
(x−x¯)2ki
2ki
+ q¯i
x¯ρ¯i
ρ¯i
+ ri
(u1i−u¯1i)
2ki
2ki
+ r¯i
u¯
ρ¯i
1i
ρ¯i
dt,
infui E[Li(x, u)],
subject to
dx =
∑
i(u1i − u¯1i) + (1 − (u2i − u¯2i))k1(x− x¯)
+
∑
i(u2i − u¯2i)k2(x− x¯)dt
+
∑
i(u2i − u¯2i)(x− x¯)[σdB +
∫
µdN˜ ]
+
∑
i[−u¯1i + (1− u¯2i)k¯1x¯+ u¯2ik¯2x¯]dt
+
∑
i u¯2ix¯[σ¯dBo +
∫
µ¯dN˜o],
x(0) = x0.
(28)
This can be easily extended to include multi-type power utilities in the fol-
lowing form:
∑K
k=1 qik
(x−x¯)ρik
ρik
+ q¯ik
x¯ρ¯ik
ρ¯ik
+
∑K
k=1 rik
(u1i−u¯1i)
ρik
ρik
+ r¯ik
u¯
ρ¯ik
1i
ρ¯ik
.
(29)
In this case, the guess functional will be
K∑
k=1
pik
(x− x¯)ρik
ρik
+ p¯ik
x¯ρ¯ik
ρ¯ik
,
with an ordinary differential system for pik, and p¯ik.
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3.4 Non-Linear State and Log-Utility
We consider the following logarithmic Cobb-Douglas utility.


Ri(x, u) = −qiT (xT−x¯T )
2ki
2ki
+ log[(x¯T )
q¯iT ]
+
∫ T
0
−qi (x−x¯)
2ki
2ki
− ri (u1i−u¯1i)
2ki
2ki
+ log[x¯q¯i u¯r¯i1i]dt
supui E[Ri(x, u)],
subject to
dx =
∑
i[−(u1i − u¯1i) + (1− (u2i − u¯2i))κ1(x− x¯)]
+
∑
i(u2i − u¯2i)κ2(x− x¯)dt
+
∑
i(u2i − u¯2i)(x − x¯)[σdB +
∫
µdN˜ ]
+
∑
i[−u¯1i + (1 − u¯2i)κ¯1x¯+ u¯2iκ¯2x¯]dt
+
∑
i u¯2ix¯[σ¯dBo +
∫
µ¯dN˜o],
x(0) = x0, s(0) = s0,
P(s(t+ ǫ) = s′|s, u) = ∫ t+ǫ
t
q˜ss′dt
′ + o(ǫ), s′ 6= s
(30)
where the coefficients are regime-switching dependent.
Note that the state dynamics (30) is not linear in (x, u).
Following the same method as above, the problem (30) can be solved explic-
itly.
3.5 Cotangent Drift
This subsection we examine mean-field-type games with cotangent drift. This
class of games is inspired from [11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20]. We have
modified the model to include mean-field terms. Using trigonometric relation-
33
ships a semi-explicit equilibrium solution is derived.
Li(x, u) =∫ T
0
((ui − u¯i)2 − qi) cos2(x−x¯4 ) + qi + (u¯2i − q¯i) cos2( x¯4 ) + q¯idt,
infui E[Li(x, u)],
subject to
dx = [ 12 cot(
x−x¯
2 ) +
∑
j b2j(uj − u¯j) + 12cot( x¯2 ) +
∑
j b¯2ju¯j ]dt
+σdB,
x(0) = x0.
(31)
where the coefficients are regime-switching dependent and cot(θ) = 1tan(θ) =
−cot(−θ).
Proposition 7 Assume that qi > 0, q¯i > 0. The mean-field-type game problem
with cotangent drift (31) has a unique equilibrium solution which is given by
u∗i − u¯∗i = −
∑
s∈S 1l{s(t)=s}b2i
αi
4 tan(
x−x¯
4 )
u¯∗ = −∑s∈S 1l{s(t)=s} α¯i4 b¯2itan( x¯4 )
E[Li(x, u
∗)] =
E[αi(0, s0) sin
2(x0−x¯04 ) + α¯i(0, s0) sin
2( x¯04 ) + δi(0, s0)],
(32)
whenever the following system
34
α˙i + qi − (2 + σ2)αi8 − α
2
i
16 b
2
2i
+
∑
s′ [αi(t, s
′)− αi(t, s)]q˜ss′ − αi8
∑
j 6=i αjb
2
j = 0,
αi(T, s) = 0,
˙¯αi + q¯i − α¯i4 − α¯
2
i
16 b¯
2
2i
+
∑
s′ [α¯i(t, s
′)− α¯i(t, s)]q˜ss′ − α¯i8
∑
j 6=i b¯
2
2jα¯j = 0,
α¯i(T, s) = 0,
δ˙i +
αi
16 (2 + σ
2) + α¯i8 +
∑
s′ [δi(t, s
′)− δi(t, s)]q˜ss′ = 0,
δi(T, s) = 0,
(33)
has a unique solution with positive αi, α¯i which do not blow up within [0, T ]. 
Proof:
We prove the statement using a direct method. Step 1: We observe that the
mean-field-type problem is driven by functionals of x− x¯ and x¯ which are con-
ditionally orthogonal processes.
Step 2: Given the structure of the problem, we propose the following guess
functional:
fi = αi(t, s) sin
2(
x − x¯
4
) + α¯i(t, s) sin
2(
x¯
4
) + δi(t, s),
be a guess functional.
Step 3: we apply Brownian with regime switching to obtain the difference
35
between the cost functional and the guess functional as:
E[Li − fi(0)] = −Efi(T )
+E
∫ T
0
cos2(x−x¯4 )
(
u− u¯+ b2i αi4 tan(x−x¯4 )
)2
dt
+E
∫ T
0
sin2(x−x¯4 )
{
α˙i + qi − (2 + σ2)αi8 − α
2
i
16 b
2
2i
+
∑
s′ [αi(t, s
′)− αi(t, s)]q˜ss′ − αi8
∑
j 6=i αjb
2
j
}
dt
+δ˙i +
αi
16 (2 + σ
2) +
∑
s′ [δi(t, s
′)− δi(t, s)]q˜ss′
+
{
˙¯αi + q¯i − α¯i4 − α¯
2
i
16 b¯
2
2i
+
∑
s′ [α¯i(t, s
′)− α¯i(t, s)]q˜ss′ − α¯i8
∑
j 6=i b¯
2
2jα¯j } sin2( x¯4 )dt
+cos2( x¯4 )[u¯i +
α¯i
4 b¯2itan(
x¯
4 )]
2 + α¯i8 dt,
(34)
Step 4: Noting the terms completion leads to a strictly concave one-shot op-
timization with coercive function cos2( x¯4 )[u¯i+
α¯i
4 b¯2itan(
x¯
4 )]
2 whenever cos2( x¯4 ) >
0.
Step 5: By identification of processes one obtains the announced result. This
completes the proof. 
The mean-field term x¯ solves
dx¯ = [ 12cot(
x¯
2 )−
∑
j b¯
2
2j
α¯j
4 tan(
x¯
4 )]dt,
x¯(0) = x¯0,
(35)
which has a unique solution for x¯0 ∈ (0, π).
3.6 Hyperbolic coTangent Drift
Problem (31) can be modified to handle the hyperbolic cotangent drift case as
specified below. The functions cos, sin, tan, cot are replaced by cosh, sinh, tanh, coth
36
respectively.
Li(x, u) =
∫ T
0
((ui − u¯i)2 + qi) cosh2(x−x¯4 )− qi
+(u¯2i + q¯i) cosh
2( x¯4 )− q¯idt,
infui E[Li(x, u)],
subject to
dx = [ 12 coth(
x−x¯
2 ) +
∑
j b2j(uj − u¯j)
+ 12coth(
x¯
2 ) +
∑
j b¯2ju¯j ]dt+ σdB,
x(0) = x0.
(36)
where the coefficients are regime-switching dependent and coth(θ) = e
θ+eθ
eθ−e−θ =
− coth(−θ).
Proposition 8 The equilibrium strategies and the equilibrium costs are given
by
u∗i − u¯∗i = −
∑
s∈S 1l{s(t)=s}b2i
αi
4 tanh(
x−x¯
4 )
u¯∗i = −
∑
s∈S 1l{s(t)=s}
α¯i
4 b¯2i tanh(
x¯
4 )
E[Li(x, u
∗)] = E[αi(0, s0) sinh
2(x0−x¯04 )]
+E[α¯i(0, s0) sinh
2( x¯04 ) + δi(0, s0)],
(37)
whenever the following system:
α˙i + qi + (2 + σ
2)αi8 − α
2
i
16 b
2
2i
+
∑
s′ [αi(t, s
′)− αi(t, s)]q˜ss′ − αi8
∑
j 6=i αjb
2
j = 0,
.αi(T, s) = 0,
˙¯αi + q¯i +
α¯i
4 − α¯
2
i
16 b¯
2
2i
+
∑
s′ [α¯i(t, s
′)− α¯i(t, s)]q˜ss′ − α¯i8
∑
j 6=i b¯
2
2jα¯j = 0,
α¯i(T, s) = 0,
δ˙i +
αi
16 (2 + σ
2) + α¯i8 +
∑
s′ [δi(t, s
′)− δi(t, s)]q˜ss′ = 0
δi(T, s) = 0,
(38)
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has unique solution with positive (αi, α¯i)i which do not blow up within [0, T ]. 
The system in (38) shares some similarities with the system in (33) of Prob-
lem (31). However, these two systems are different. In particular, the sign of
the terms (2 + σ2)αi8 , and
α¯i
4 have changed.
Proof.
We prove the statement on the hyperbolic game using a direct method. Let
fi(t, x, s) = αi(t, s(t)) sinh
2(x(t)−x¯(t)4 )
+α¯i(t, s(t)) sinh
2( x¯(t)4 ) + δi(t, s(t)),
be a guess functional combining hyperbolic functions.
E[Li − fi(0)] = −Efi(T )
+E
∫ T
0
cosh2(x−x¯4 )
(
u− u¯+ b2i αi4 tanh(x−x¯4 )
)2
dt
+E
∫ T
0
sinh2(x−x¯4 )
{
α˙i + qi + (2 + σ
2)αi8 − α
2
i
16 b
2
2i
+
∑
s′ [αi(t, s
′)− αi(t, s)]q˜ss′ − αi8
∑
j 6=i αjb
2
j
}
dt
+δ˙i +
αi
16 (2 + σ
2) + α¯i8 +
∑
s′ [δi(t, s
′)− δi(t, s)]q˜ss′
+
{
˙¯αi + q¯i +
α¯i
4 − α¯
2
i
16 b¯
2
2i
+
∑
s′ [α¯i(t, s
′)− α¯i(t, s)]q˜ss′ − α¯i8
∑
j 6=i b¯
2
2jα¯j } sinh2( x¯4 )dt
+cosh2( x¯4 )[u¯i +
α¯i
4 b¯2i tanh(
x¯
4 )]
2dt,
(39)
By identification one obtains the announced result. This completes the proof.

The mean-field term x¯ solves
dx¯ = [ 12coth(
x¯
2 )−
∑
j b¯
2
2j
α¯j
4 tanh(
x¯
4 )]dt,
x¯(0) = x¯0 6= 0,
(40)
which has a unique global solution within [0, T ].
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3.7 A Delayed and Trend-based MFTG
We present a cooperative MFTG with basic state dynamics x(t), regime switch-
ing s(t), a trend y(t) :=
∫ 0
−τ e
λt′x(t + t′)dt′ on the time window [t − τ, t], the
delayed state z(t) = x(t− τ). This class of examples plays an important role in
real-world applications as the effects of actions are not instantaneous in general
[28, 29, 30, 31]. It may take a certain time delay. This leads to delayed and
trend-based stochastic differential equations of mean-field type.
R(x, u) = −qT var(xT ) + (x¯T+η¯y¯T )
ρ
ρ∫ T
0
−q var(x) − r1 var(u1) + r¯1 u¯
ρ
1
ρ
dt,
sup(u1,u2) E[R(x, u)],
subject to
dx = [−(u1 − u¯1) + b1(x − x¯) + b2ǫ(x− x¯)(u2 − u¯2)]dt
+[−u¯1 + b¯11x¯+ b¯12y¯ + b¯13z¯ + b¯2u¯2x¯]dt
+σ(x− x¯)(u2 − u¯2)dB + σ¯x¯u¯2dBo,
x(t′) = x0(t
′), t′ ∈ (−δ, 0], s(0) = s0,
(41)
where var(X) denotes the variance of the random variable X, and X¯(t) =
E[X(t)| Fs,Bo ] is the conditional expectation with respect to the common noises
s,Bo.
Lemma 1 The conditional expected trend y¯ satisfies the following stochastic
differential equation:
dy¯ = [x¯− τ y¯ − e−λτ z¯]dt.

Proof:
dy = dt
∫ 0
−τ
eλs[
d
dt
x(t+ s)]ds = [x(t) − e−λτz(t)− τy(t)]dt.
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Taking the conditional expected values one obtains
dy¯ = [x¯− τ y¯ − e−λτ z¯]dt.
This completes the proof. 
Proposition 9 The equilibrium strategies and the equilibrium payoff of the de-
layed MFTG (41) are given by
u∗1 =
∑
s∈S 1l{s(t)=s}[
α
r1
(x− x¯) + (x¯+ η¯y¯)( β
r¯1
)
1
ρ−1 ],
u∗2 =
∑
s∈S 1l{s(t)=s}[− b2ǫσ2 − (x¯+η¯y¯)(βb¯2+βBo σ¯)2(ρ−1)βσ¯2x¯ ],
E[R(x, u∗)] = E[−α(0, s0)var(x) + β(0, s0) (x¯0+η¯y¯0)
ρ
ρ
],
(42)
whenever the following system:
dα+ (2b1α+ q +
∑
s′ [α(t, s
′)− α(t, s)]q˜ss′ − α2r1 − b22ǫα)dt = 0,
α(t, s) = qT ,
dβ − ( ρ
ρ−1
(βb¯2+βBo σ¯)
2
4βσ¯2 )dt
+βρ(b11 + b13e
λτ ) + β
ρ
ρ−1 (ρ− 1)(r¯1)− 1ρ−1 dt
+
∑
s′ [β(t, s
′)− β(t, s)]q˜ss′dt
= 0,
β(T, s) = 1,
η¯ := b13e
λτ ,
(43)
has a unique solution α, β, βBo 
Note that the system in α has a positive solution if q ≥ 0, qT ≥ 0, r1 > 0.
With single regime S = {s0} the β equation yields
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β˙ + β[− ρ
ρ−1
b¯22
4σ¯2 + ρ(b11 + b13e
λτ )] + β
ρ
ρ−1 (ρ− 1)(r¯1)− 1ρ−1 = 0,
β(T, s) = 1,
(44)
This is completely solvable with an explicit solution given by
β(t, s) = E[((1 − c
ω
)e
−ω
ρ−1
(T−t) +
c
ω
)1−ρ| s(t) = s]
where
c := (1 − ρ)r¯
1
1−ρ
1 , ω :=
ρ
1− ρ
b¯22
4σ¯2
+ ρ(b11 + b13e
λτ ) > 0.
Proof:
Let f(x) = −α var(x) + β (x¯+η¯y¯)ρ
ρ
, be a guess functional.
E[R− f(0)] = E− (qT − αT )var(xT ) + (1− βT ) (x¯+η¯y¯)
ρ
ρ
+E
∫ T
0
−{dα+ (2b1α+ q)dt
+
∑
s′ [α(t, s
′)− α(t, s)]q˜ss′dt+ (−α2r1 − b22ǫα)dt
}
(x− x¯)2
−r1[u1 − u¯1 − αr (x− x¯)]2dt
−ασ2[u2 − u¯2 + b2ǫσ2 ]2(x− x¯)2dt
+{dβ − ρ
ρ−1
(βb¯2+βBo σ¯)
2
4βσ¯2 dt− ρρ−1 (βb¯2+βBo σ¯)2σ¯ dBo
+(βρ(b11 + b13e
λτ ) + β
ρ
ρ−1 (ρ− 1)(r¯1)− 1ρ−1 )dt
+
∑
s′ [β(t, s
′)− β(t, s)]q˜ss′dt} (x¯+η¯y¯)
ρ
ρ
+(ρ− 1)βσ¯2x¯2(x¯+ η¯y¯)ρ−2[u¯2 + (x¯+η¯y¯)(βb¯2+βBo σ¯)2(ρ−1)βσ¯2x¯ ]2dt
+[−(x¯+ η¯y¯)ρ−1βu¯1 + r¯1u¯
ρ
1
ρ
−β ρρ−1 (x¯+ η¯y¯)ρ(1− 1
ρ
)(r¯1)
− 1
ρ−1 ]dt,
(45)
with the following careful matching η = b¯13e
λτ , b¯12 = b¯13e
λτ (b11 + λ+ b¯13e
λτ ).
The joint optimization over (u1, u2) together with the mean-field terms (u¯1, u¯2)
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gives the announced result provided that ρ < 1.
3.8 Mean-Field of MFTG
This subsection we examine a class of mean-field of mean-field-type games.
In view of the delayed mean-field-type game (41), we have modified r¯1 to
be r¯1(m) where m is the conditional total consumption of the large population.
Then, m is obtained as
m =
∫
u¯1(t, x¯, y¯)µ
m(t, dx¯, dy¯),
where µm(t, dx¯, dy¯) is the conditional distribution of all players’ states and
trends in the large population underm, which reduces to the fixed-point problem
m = (x¯(m) + η¯y¯(m))( β(m)
r¯1(m)
)
1
ρ−1 .
Now consider the following modified Cournot-Ross game with I producers
and a large population of potential consumers. The mean-field-type version of
the game under common noise is analyzed in [21].
Ri(x, u) = R¯ − (xT−x¯T )
2k
2k +
(x¯T )
2k
2k
+
∫ T
0
−r¯i (ui−u¯i)
2k
2k + x¯
2k−1u¯i − r¯i u¯
2k
i
2k dt,
supui E[Ri(x, u)],
subject to
dx = [D(m)− S]dt+ σ(x − x¯)dB,
x(0) = x0, s(0) = s0,
(46)
Let D(m) be the demand generated by a large population of consumers. Given a
demand D(m), each macro-player i has a certain utility of mean-field type. The
payoff function in the Cournot game x¯u¯i+r¯i
u¯2i
2 is modified to be x¯
2k−1u¯i−r¯i u¯
2k
i
2k
and some extra mean-field dependent terms.
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By means of a direct method one can fully characterize the mean-field equi-
librium of (46). It is given by following set of equations:
E[Ri(x, u
∗)] = E[R¯ − αi(0, s0) (x0−x¯0)
2k
2k − α¯i(0, s0) (x¯T )
2k
2k ],
u∗i = (
αi
ri
)
1
2k−1 (x− x¯) + ( α¯i+1
r¯i
)
1
2k−1 x¯,
D(m) = [
∑
i(
α¯i+1
r¯i
)
1
2k−1 ]x¯.
(47)
where αi, α¯i solve a system of ordinary differential equations.
4 MFTG beyond Brownian motions and Pois-
son
In this section class of mean-field-type games with a state dependent Gauss-
Volterra noise is formulated and solved with a polynomial and mean-field de-
pendent payoff for an arbitrary number of players and a finite time horizon.
The control strategies are linear state and mean-field feedbacks. A mean-field-
type Nash equilibrium is verified for the game and the optimal strategies are
obtained using a direct method that does not require solving nonlinear partial
integro-differential equations or forward-backward stochastic differential equa-
tions. The example below is inspired from [22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27]. We add
mean-field terms to these previous works. This will allow us to solve variance
or higher moment reduction problems.
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4.1 Noncooperative MFTG under Gauss-Volterra processes
This section examines a class of noncooperative mean-field-type games with
non-quadratic cost and state driven by Gauss-Volterra processes.
Li(x, u) = qiT
(xT−x¯T )
2ki
2ki
+ q¯iT
x¯
2k¯i
T
2k¯i
+
∫ T
0
qi
(x−x¯)2ki
2ki
+ ri
(ui−u¯i)
2ki
2ki
+ q¯i
x¯2k¯i
2k¯i
+ r¯i
u¯
2k¯i
i
2k¯i
dt,
infui E[Li(x, u)],
subject to
dx = [b1(x− x¯) +
∑
j b2j(uj − u¯j) + b¯1x¯+
∑
j b¯2j u¯j]dt
+(x− x¯)[σdB + ∫
Θ
µdN˜ + σgvdBgv],
P(s(t+ ǫ) = s′|s, u) = ∫ t+ǫ
t
q˜ss′dt
′ + o(ǫ), s′ 6= s
x(0) = x0, s(0) = s0,
(48)
where ki ≥ 1, k¯i ≥ 1 are natural numbers, the coefficients are time and switching
dependent,
Remark 3 The cost functional is clearly non-quadratic for ki > 1 or k¯i > 1.
For ki = 1 the equilibrium of the variance reduction game (48) under Gauss-
Volterra processes is obtained.
Proposition 10 Assume qi > 0, q¯i > 0, ri, r¯i > δ and
∫
θ
[(1 + µ)2ki − 1 −
2kiµ]ν(dθ) < +∞. The mean-field Nash equilibrium of the mean-field type game
(48) under Gauss-Volterra process is given by
u∗i =
∑
s∈S 1l{s(t)=s}[
(
− b2iαi
ri
) 1
2ki−1
(x− x¯) +
(
− b¯2iα¯i
r¯i
) 1
2k¯i−1
x¯],
ELi = E[αi(0, s0)
(x0−x¯0)
2ki
2ki
+ α¯i(0, s0)
x¯
2k¯i
0
2k¯i
],
(49)
whenever the following system of ordinary differential equations admit a positive
solution which does not blowup within [0, T ].
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α˙i + qi + 2kiαib1 + αiki(2ki − 1)(σ2 + σ2cogv)
+αi
∫
θ
[(1 + µ)2ki − 1− 2kiµ]ν(dθ)
+(
∑
s′ [αi(t, s
′)− αi(t, s)]q˜ss′ )
−(2ki − 1)ri(− b2iαiri )
2ki
2ki−1
+2kiαi[
∑
j 6=i b2j(− b2jαjrj )
1
2kj−1 = 0,
αi(T, s) = qi(T, s),
˙¯αi + q¯i + 2k¯iα¯ib¯1 + (
∑
s′ [α¯i(t, s
′)− α¯i(t, s)]q˜ss′)
−(2k¯i − 1)r¯i(− b¯2iα¯ir¯i )
2k¯i
2k¯i−1
+2k¯iα¯i[
∑
j 6=i b¯2j(− b¯2j α¯jr¯j )
1
2k¯j−1 ] = 0,
α¯i(T, s) = q¯i(T, s),
(50)

Proof:
Consider the guess functional fi = αi
(x−x¯)2ki
2ki
+ α¯i
x¯2k¯i
2k¯i
E[Li − fi(0)] = E(qiT − αi(T, s(T ))) (xT−x¯T )
2ki
2ki
+(q¯iT − α¯i(T, s(T ))) x¯
2k¯i
T
2k¯i
+E
∫ T
0
qi
(x−x¯)2ki
2ki
α˙i
(x−x¯)2ki
2ki
+ αib1(x− x¯)2ki
+ri
(ui−u¯i)
2k¯i
2k¯i
+ [
∑
j αi(x− x¯)2ki−1b2j(uj − u¯j)]
+αiki(2ki − 1)(σ2+σ2cogv) (x−x¯)
2ki
2ki
+αi
∫
θ
[(1 + µ)2ki − 1− µ2ki]ν(dθ) (x−x¯)
2ki
2ki
+(
∑
s′ [αi(t, s
′)− αi(t, s)]q˜ss′) (x−x¯)
2ki
2ki
+q¯i
x¯2k¯i
2k¯i
++ ˙¯αi
x¯2k¯i
2k¯i
+ α¯ix¯
2k¯i b¯1
+r¯i
u¯
2k¯i
i
2k¯i
+ α¯ix¯
2k¯i−1[
∑
j b¯2j u¯j ]
+(
∑
s′ [α¯i(t, s
′)− α¯i(t, s)]q˜ss′) x¯2k¯i2k¯i
(51)
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We complete the following term:
ri
(ui−u¯i)
2k¯
2ki
+ αi(x− x¯)2ki−1b2i(ui − u¯i)
= ri
(ui−u¯i)
2k¯
2ki
+ αi(x − x¯)2ki−1b2i(ui − u¯i)
= ri
(ui−u¯i)
2k¯i
2ki
+ αi(x− x¯)2ki−1b2i(ui − u¯i)
+(2ki − 1)ri(− b2iαiri )
2ki
2ki−1
(x−x¯)2ki
2ki
−(2ki − 1)ri(− b2iαiri )
2ki
2ki−1
(x−x¯)2ki
2ki
(52)
A similar completion is done for the terms in u¯i. Thus,
E[Li − fi(0)]
= E(qiT − αi(T )) (xT−x¯T )
2ki
2ki
+ (q¯iT − α¯i(T )) x¯
2k¯i
T
2k¯i
+E
∫ T
0
{
[α˙i + qi + 2kiαib1 + αiki(2ki − 1)(σ2 + σ2cogv)
+αi
∫
θ
[(1 + µ)2ki − 1− µ2ki]ν(dθ)
+
∑
s′ [αi(t, s
′)− αi(t, s)]q˜ss′
−(2ki − 1)ri(− b2iαiri )
2ki
2ki−1
+2kiαi
∑
j 6=i b2j(− b2jαjrj )
1
2kj−1 } (x−x¯)2ki2ki
+
{
˙¯αi + q¯i + 2k¯iα¯ib¯1 + (
∑
s′ [α¯i(t, s
′)− α¯i(t, s)]q˜ss′ )
−(2k¯i − 1)r¯i(− b¯2iα¯ir¯i )
2k¯i
2k¯i−1
+2k¯iα¯i[
∑
j 6=i b¯2j(− b¯2j α¯jr¯j )
1
2k¯j−1 ] } x¯2k¯i
2k¯i
+ri[
(ui−u¯i)
2ki
2ki
+ αi(x− x¯)2ki−1b2i(ui − u¯i)]
+(2ki − 1)ri(− b2iαiri )
2ki
2ki−1
(x−x¯)2ki
2ki
+r¯i[
u¯
2k¯i
i
2k¯i
+ α¯ix¯
2k¯i−1b2iu¯i]
+(2k¯i − 1)r¯i(− b¯2iα¯ir¯i )
2k¯
2k¯i−1
x¯2k¯i
2k¯i
(53)
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Noting for ki >
1
2 , ri > 0 one has:
ri
(ui−u¯i)
2k¯i
2k¯i
+ αi(x− x¯)2ki−1b2i(ui − u¯i)
+(2ki − 1)ri(− b2iαiri )
2ki
2ki−1
(x−x¯)2ki
2ki
≥ 0,
r¯i
u¯2k¯i
2k¯i
+ α¯ix¯
2k¯i−1b2iu¯i
+(2k¯i − 1)r¯i(− b¯2iα¯ir¯i )
2k¯i
2k¯i−1
x¯2k¯i
2k¯i
≥ 0,
(54)
with equalities in (54) iff
ui − u¯i = (−b2iαi
ri
)
1
2ki−1 (x − x¯), u¯i = (− b¯2iα¯i
r¯i
)
1
2k¯i−1 x¯.
By identification, one obtains the announced result. 
The derived system of equations (50) are inhomogeneous differential system
where it is known that existence and uniqueness, nonexistence or nonuniqueness
may occur.
Existence
Some results on sufficient conditions for the existence of trajectories satisfying
the associated set of non-linear differential equations (50) are outlined. Below
we present Carathe´odory conditions for existence of a solution.
Here, the non-linear differential system (50) can be written as
α˙ = h(t, α),
αi(T, s) = qi(T, s), s ∈ S, i ∈ N .
(55)
Assume that
• For each fixed time t ∈ [0, T ], h is continuous in α.
• For each fixed α, h is measurable in t.
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• Given a nonempty compact C ⊂ Rn|S| and interval [T − ǫ, T ], there is
an integrable positive function hˆ on the time interval [T − ǫ, T ] such that
|h(t, α)| ≤ hˆ(t), for all (t, α) ∈ [0, T ]× C.
The interval of definition of the solution depends on the terminal value
q(T, s). For each terminal condition q(T, .) ∈ Rn|S|, there is an interval (T −
ǫ, T ), ǫ > 0 where this non-linear differential system (55) has at least one solu-
tion. We refer to [32, Theorem 1.1, Chapter 2] for a detailed proof.
Uniqueness
It is a well-known result that not every non-linear differential system has a
unique solution. Therefore, the uniqueness issue is dealt with in a separate
result. We provide two sufficient conditions for having at most one solution:
• If h is continuously differentiable in α and |hα(t, α)| ≤ hˆ(t), on (t, α) ∈
[0, T ]× C, then there is at most one solution on [T − ǫ, T ].
• If |h(t, α1)− h(t, α2)| ≤ hˆ(t)|α1 − α2|, on (t, α) ∈ [0, T ]× C, then there is
at most one solution on [T − ǫ, T ].
It is important the notice that the function h is not necessarily globally Lip-
schitz in α. For example, for k ≥ 1, α
2k
2k−1
i is not necessarily globally Lipschitz.
Therefore we need estimates of α. We rely on the original dynamic optimization
problem to derive lower and upper bounds on αi. Since q(T, .), q(t, .) ≻ 0, ri >
δ > 0 by assumption, lower bound for αi is zero. This can also be obtained
directly from the problem formulation as the cost is positive. By summing up
(50) over i ∈ I, an upper bound is obtained as ∑i αi is bounded subject to
integrability condition of the coefficients.
Note, however, that the stationary system may have multiple solutions, de-
pending on the parameters.
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Admissibility of the coefficient solution
As ǫ in the Carathe´odory existence result depends on q(T, .), the maximal in-
terval in which the solution is defined may depend on q(T, .). Thus, we need
to examine the singularity of α in (50). In order for the control strategies to
be admissible, we seek sufficient conditions for non-blow-up (no escape) within
[0, T If qi > 0, ri > δ > 0 and all coefficients continuous, then there is no es-
cape within [T−ǫ, T ]. If in addition the coefficient functions b1, σ2, σ2cogv,
∫
θ
[(1+
µ)2ki − 1 − 2kiµ]ν(dθ), ri( b2iri )
2ki
2ki−1 and ( b2i
ri
)
1
2kj−1 are all integrable within T ,
then there is no escape of α within the entire [0, T ] as the estimates of
∑
i∈I αi
is finite in T .
Similar reasoning works for α¯ when q¯i > 0, r¯i > δ > 0 and the coefficient
functions b¯1, r¯i(
b¯2i
r¯i
)
2k¯i
2k¯i−1 , ( b¯2i
ri
)
1
2k¯i−1 are integrable within T .
At equilibrium, the mean-field term x¯ in Proposition 10 solves
dx¯ = [b¯1 +
∑
j b¯2j
(
− b¯2j α¯j
r¯j
) 1
2k¯j−1
]x¯dt,
x¯(0) = x¯0,
(56)
which admits a unique solution within [0, T ] subject to the integrability of the
regime switching dependent coefficient [b¯1+
∑
j b¯2j
(
− b¯2j α¯j
r¯j
) 1
2k¯j−1
] over [0, T ].
4.2 Fully Cooperative MFTG under Gauss-Volterra Noise
In this subsection we choose ki = k, k¯i = k¯ and assume that the I decision-
makers are fully cooperative. They jointly decide and solve the following prob-
lem:
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inf(u1,...,un) E[
∑
i∈I Li(x, u)],
subject to
dx = [b1(x− x¯) +
∑
j b2j(uj − u¯j) + b¯1x¯+
∑
j b¯2j u¯j]dt
+(x− x¯)[σdB + ∫Θ µdN˜ + σgvdBgv],
P(s(t+ ǫ) = s′|s, u) = ∫ t+ǫ
t
q˜ss′dt
′ + o(ǫ), s′ 6= s
x(0) = x0, s(0) = s0,
(57)
Proposition 11 The global optimum of the fully cooperative mean-field type
game (57) under Gauss-Volterra process is given by
u∗i =
∑
s∈S 1l{s(t)=s}[
(
− b2iα0
ri
) 1
2k−1
(x− x¯) +
(
− b¯2iα¯0
r¯i
) 1
2k¯−1
x¯],
ELi = E[α0(0, s0)
(x0−x¯0)
2k
2k + α¯0(0, s0)
x¯2k¯0
2k¯
],
(58)
whenever the following system of ordinary differential equations admit a positive
solution which does not blowup within [0, T ].
α˙0 + (
∑
i qi) + 2kα0b1 + α0k(2k − 1)(σ2+σ2cogv)
+α0
∫
θ
[(1 + µ)2k − 1− 2kµ]ν(dθ)
+
∑
s′ [α0(t, s
′)− α0(t, s)]q˜ss′
−(2k − 1)∑i ri(− b2iα0ri ) 2k2k−1 = 0,
α0(T, s) =
∑
i qi(T, s),
˙¯α0 + (
∑
i q¯i) + 2k¯α¯0b¯1 + (
∑
s′ [α¯0(t, s
′)− α¯0(t, s)]q˜ss′ )
−(2k¯ − 1)∑i r¯i(− b¯2iα¯0r¯i ) 2k¯2k¯−1 = 0,
α¯0(T, s) =
∑
i q¯i(T, s),
(59)

Proof: The proof follows similar steps as in Proposition 10.
Remark 4 A sufficient condition for existence and uniqueness of the global
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optimum of mean-field type is obtained for ri > δ > 0,
∑
i qi > 0,
∫
θ
[(1+µ)2k−
1 − 2kµ]ν(dθ) < +∞ and all coefficients continuous. Then there is no escape
within [T − ǫ, T ]. If in addition the coefficient functions b1, σ2, σ2cogv,
∫
θ
[(1 +
µ)2k − 1 − 2kµ]ν(dθ), ri( b2iri )
2k
2k−1 and ( b2i
ri
)
1
2k−1 are all integrable within [0, T ],
then is no escape of α within the entire interval [0, T ]. Similar reasoning works
for α¯ when r¯i > δ > 0, i ∈ I,
∑
j q¯j > 0, and the coefficient functions b¯1,
r¯i(
b¯2i
r¯i
)
2k¯i
2k¯−1 , ( b¯2i
ri
)
1
2k¯−1 are integrable within [0, T ].
At the global optimum, the mean-field term x¯ in Proposition 11 solves
dx¯ =

b¯1 +∑j b¯2j
(
− b¯2j α¯0
r¯j
) 1
2k¯−1

 x¯dt,
x¯(0) = x¯0,
(60)
which admits a unique solution within [0, T ] subject to the integrability of the
regime switching dependent coefficient b¯1 +
∑
j b¯2j
(
− b¯2j α¯0
r¯j
) 1
2k¯−1
over [0, T ].
Remark 5 Notice that the differential equation
ξ˙ + q + c1ξ − c2ξp = 0,
ξ(T ) = q(T ) ≥ 0
q(t) > 0, c2(t) > 0
p = 2k2k−1 > 1,
(61)
has a unique solution within [0, T ]. Moreover, the unique solution is positive.
4.3 Adversarial Mean-Field-Type Game under Gauss-Volterra
Noise
In this subsection we choose ki = k ≥ 1, k¯i = k¯ ≥ 1 and assume that the n
decision-makers are divided into two teams I+ = {i ∈ I | ri > δ > 0, r¯i >
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δ > 0}, I− = {i ∈ I| ri < −δ < 0, r¯i < −δ < 0} and I = I+ ∪ I−. The
decision-makers in team I+ minimize the functional ELad(x, u) over (ui)i∈I+ .
The decision-makers in team I− maximize ELad(x, u) over (uj)j∈I− This leads
to a minmax game problem:
Lad(x, u) = qT
(xT−x¯T )
2k
2k + q¯T
x¯2k¯T
2k¯
+
∫ T
0
q
(x−x¯)2k
2k +
∑
i ri
(ui−u¯i)
2k¯
2k¯
+ q¯ x¯
2k
2k +
∑
i r¯i
u¯2k¯i
2k¯
dt,
inf(ui)i∈I+ sup(uj)j∈I− E[Lad(x, u)],
subject to
dx = [b1(x− x¯) +
∑
j b2j(uj − u¯j) + b¯1x¯+
∑
j b¯2j u¯j]dt
+(x− x¯)[σdB + ∫
Θ
µdN˜ + σgvdBgv],
P(s(t+ ǫ) = s′|s, u) = ∫ t+ǫ
t
q˜ss′dt
′ + o(ǫ), s′ 6= s
x(0) = x0, s(0) = s0,
(62)
A mean-field-type risk-neutral saddle point is a strategy profile (u∗j , j ∈ I+),
of the team of defenders and (u∗j , j ∈ I−) of the team of attackers such that
ELad(x, s, (u
∗
i )i∈I+ , (uj)j∈I−) ≤ ELad(X, s, u∗)
≤ ELad(X, s, (ui)i∈I+ , (u∗j )j∈I− ), ∀ (ui)i∈I+ , (uj)j∈I−
Proposition 12 Assume I+ ∪I− = I and q > 0, q¯ > 0. Then, the minmax so-
lution of the adversarial mean-field type game (62) under Gauss-Volterra process
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is given by
i ∈ I+,
u∗i =
∑
s∈S 1l{s(t)=s}[
(
− b2iαad
ri
) 1
2k−1
(x− x¯) +
(
− b¯2iα¯ad
r¯i
) 1
2k¯−1
x¯],
j ∈ I−,
u∗j =
∑
s∈S 1l{s(t)=s}
(
− b2jαad
rj
) 1
2k−1
(x − x¯) +
(
− b¯2j α¯ad
r¯j
) 1
2k¯−1
x¯,
ELad = E[αad(0, s0)
(x0−x¯0)
2k
2k + α¯ad(0, s0)
x¯2k¯0
2k¯
],
(63)
whenever the following system of ordinary differential equations admit a positive
solution which does not blowup within the horizon [0, T ].
0 = α˙ad + q + 2kαadb1 + αadk(2k − 1)(σ2+σ2cogv)
+αad
∫
θ
[(1 + µ)2k − 1− 2kµ]ν(dθ)
+
∑
s′ [αad(t, s
′)− αad(t, s)]q˜ss′
−(2k − 1)α
2k
2k−1
ad [
∑
i∈I+
ri(− b2iri )
2k
2k−1 +
∑
j∈I−
rj(− b2jrj )
2k
2k−1 ],
αad(T, s) = q(T, s),
0 = ˙¯αad + q¯ + 2k¯α¯adb¯1 + (
∑
s′ [α¯ad(t, s
′)− α¯ad(t, s)]q˜ss′ )
−(2k¯ − 1)α¯
2k
2k−1
ad [
∑
i∈I+
r¯i(− b¯2ir¯i )
2k¯
2k¯−1 +
∑
j∈I−
r¯j(− b¯2jr¯j )
2k¯
2k¯−1 ],
α¯ad(T, s) = q¯(T, s),
(64)
In this case, the minmax solution is also a maxmin solution, hence (ui)i∈I+ , (uj)j∈I−
is a saddle point. Thus, the adversarial mean-field-type game has a value
ELad(x, (ui)i∈I+ , (uj)j∈I−).
The proof follows similar steps as above by exploiting the strict convex-concave
and coercivity properties of the cost functional.
Remark 6 A sufficient condition for existence and uniqueness of the minmax
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point of mean-field type is obtained:
2k − 1 > 0, q > 0,
∑
i∈I+
ri(
b2i
ri
)
2k
2k−1 +
∑
j∈I−
rj(
b2j
rj
)
2k
2k−1 > 0,
and the coefficient functions b1, σ
2, σ2cogv,
∫
θ
[(1+µ)2k−1−2kµ]ν(dθ), ri( b2iri )
2k
2k−1
and ( b2i
ri
)
1
2k−1 are all integrable within [0, T ], then is no escape of αad within the
entire interval [0, T ].
Similar reasoning works for α¯ad when
2k¯ − 1 > 0, q¯ > 0,
∑
i∈I+
r¯i(
b¯2i
r¯i
)
2k¯
2k¯−1 +
∑
j∈I−
r¯j(
b¯2j
r¯j
)
2k¯
2k¯−1 > 0,
and the coefficient functions b¯1, r¯i(
b¯2i
r¯i
)
2k¯i
2k¯−1 , ( b¯2i
ri
)
1
2k¯−1 are integrable within [0, T ].
5 Numerical Examples
In this section, we present some numerical illustrations of Problem (48) by
choosing Gauss-Volterra process with the following kernel
K(t, t′) = KH(t, t
′) = cH(t− t′)H− 12
+cH(
1
2 −H)
∫ t
t′
(z − t′)H− 32 (1− ( t′
z
)
1
2
−H)dz,
(65)
and H ∈ (0, 1), cH =
√
2HΓ( 3
2
−H)
Γ( 1
2
+H)Γ(2−2H)
, is a normalizing constant, where Γ is
the gamma function
Γ(z) =
∫ +∞
0
e−ttz−1dt, Re(z) > 0.
The Gauss-Volterra process with kernel KH is a fractional Brownian motion
with the Hurst parameter H. The parameters of the numerical setting are dis-
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played in Table 4.
Numerical setting Value
Kernel K K = K0.8
T 1
Switching S {s∗, s∗}, s∗ 6= s∗
I 2019
(ki, k¯i) (2, 2) if i ≤ 2018
(4, 2) if i = 2019
qi, q¯i, ri, r¯i 1 if i ≤ 2018
100 if i = 2019
b1, b2i, b¯2i, σ, σgv 1 if i ≤ 2018
b2i, b¯2i 10 if i = 2019
µ(t, θ, s) θ
Θ R∗+
ν(dθ) ce−5|θ|dθ
σgv(t, s
∗) 1
σgv(t, s∗) 10
−2
q˜s∗s∗ 0.7
q˜s∗s∗ 0.4
Figure 4: Parameters used in the numerical example.
It is important to notice that under this setting the problem (48) is not
Markov and the cost is not quadratic. From (10) we know that the mean-field
Nash equilibrium of the mean-field type game (48) under Gauss-Volterra process
is given by
u∗i = −α
1
3
i (x− x¯)− α¯
1
3
i x¯, i ≤ 2018
u∗i = −(αi10 )
1
7 (x − x¯)− ( α¯i10 )
1
3 x¯, i = 2019
(66)
Figure 5 plots (a) a sample path of the optimal state trajectory starting from
x0 = 50, (b) the optimal strategies of all decision-makers i ≤ 2018 and 2019,
and (c) sample noises. As expected the state is moving toward zero when the
optimal strategies are employed.
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Figure 5: Sample path of the optimal state, optimal strategy under Gauss-
Volterra, jump and diffusion. Initial state value is 50.
6 Conclusion
In this article, we have shown that a mean-field equilibrium can be determined in
a semi-explicit way for a broader class of non-linear, non-quadratic game prob-
lems with non-linearly distribution-dependent payoffs where the state dynamics
is driven by conditional expected values of states, controls, Brownian motions,
Gauss-Volterra processes, jump and regime-switching. The method does not re-
quire the sophisticated non-elementary extension to backward-forward systems.
It does not need PIDEs. It does not need SMPs. It is basic and applies the
stochastic integration formula. The use of this simple method may open the
accessibility of the tool to a broader audience including beginners and engineers
to this emerging field of mean-field-type game theory. Another direct applica-
tion of the results presented this article is that the explicit solution provides
a reference trajectory to the numerical schemes of the corresponding master
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system beyond the LQ setting.
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